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Randall: Evidence

EVIDENCE
CHARLES

H. RANDALL, JR.*

The rulings of the Supreme Court in the field of evidence
have continued to embody sound common sense during the
period covered by this Survey.- The Court has consistently
indicated its awareness that considerable discretion must be
placed in the trial judge. The latter of necessity makes his
rulings in the heat of battle and not in the calm and leisurely
atmosphere of an appellate proceeding. Both the Model Code
of Evidence2 and the Uniform Rules of Evidences have
stressed the necessity of placing this discretion in the trial
judge. The great
teachers of the law of evidence are strongly
4
of this opinion.

The cases which arose during this period involve the application of settled principles to difficult factual situations
rather than the evolution of new doctrine.
Examination of Witnesses
Opinion Evidence-Skid Marks. In Willard v McCoy, 5
the Supreme Court reiterated its rule" that a policeman who
examined the scene shortly after an accident occurred could
not give his opinion as to the events he had not seen, but
could only testify as to the markings he observed on the road.
The officer did not see the accident, but investigated some
time after the occurrence and testified as to his conclusions
that the car had turned over five or more times, and that
by his measure, using a steel tape, the car was doing eighty
miles per hour or better. He also opined that a race in
which the car had been engaged with another car had ended
before the accident. This testimony, admitted over objection,
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.

1. April 1, 1959 through March 31, 1960.
2. MODEL CoDE op EVIDENcE (1942), especially rules 105, 106, 303, 401.
3. Approved by the Conference in 1953, as well as by the American Bar
Association. See especially rule 45.
4. Examples are I WIGMoRE, EVImENCE, §§ 8c, 16 (3d Ed. 1940); MAGuIE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw, pp. 2 et seq. (1947).
5. 234 S. C. 317, 108 S. E. 2d 113 (1959).
6. Cases to the same effect cited by the Court are Thompson v. South

Carolina State Highway Dept., 224 S. C. 338, 79 S. E. 2d 160 (1953);
Huggins v. Broom, 189 S. C. 15, 199 S. E. 2d 903 (1938) ; Smith v. Hardy,
228 S. C. 112, 88 S. E. 2d 865 (1955).
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was termed by the Court "highly speculative." On the basis
of this ruling by the court below, the judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and remanded.
Inference from Failure to Call a Witness. In Davis v.
Sparks,8 an action to foreclose a mortgage, defendant counterclaimed asking reformation of the original contract of sale
of the property and the note and mortgage executed pursuant
thereto. Plaintiff had listed the property for sale with a
real estate broker, one Williams, in 1948. The listed price
was $5,750, to include the broker's commission. Another
broker, one Lake, found the purchaser, defendant herein,
and shared in the conmission. The purchaser agreed to
make a down payment of $1,500, and a contract of sale was
made on October 2, 1948, signed by the parties and the two
brokers. A note and mortgage for the balance of $4,250
were executed, payable at $35 per month, with interest at six
percent, the monthly payments to be applied first to interest
and the remainder to principal. Defendant's evidence tended
to show that she and her son, then twenty years old, went
with Mr. Lake to inspect the property and there met the
plaintiff. The latter priced the property at $4,000, and
agreed to a cash payment of $1,500. Later, at Mr. Williams'
office, the purchaser stated that she would not sign until
Mr. Williams assured her that the amount listed on the contract, $5,750, was different from the agreed price of $4,000
because it included all interest on the indebtedness. Williams
testified for the plaintiff, and denied that any such argument
concerning the price had occurred. He stated that he had
explained the transaction to the defendant, making it clear
to her that the price was $5,750, and that she had willingly
signed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the trial court had given no consideration to the
unfavorable inference9 arising from the failure of the plaintiff to call the broker, Lake, as a witness. Although indicating doubt that either the record or the exceptions raised the
point, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by the late Chief
Justice Stukes, found that no inference should be raised under
the circumstances of the case. The opinion points out that
Lake was not an employee of the plaintiff, who had no control
over him and had not listed the property with him but with
7.234 S. C. at 319, 108 S. E. 2d at 114 (1959).
8. 235 S. C. 326, 111 S. E. 2d 545 (1959).
9. MCCORMIIC, EVIDENC § 249 (1954).
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Mr. Williams. Further, plaintiff had called Mr. Williams
to testify to the same facts.'0 Additional support for the
ruling was found in the pleadings of the defendant, which,
although they referred many times to Mr. Williams, made
no reference to Mr. Lake. In these circumstances said the
Court, to raise a presumption against the plaintiff "would
in view of the contents of appellant's pleading, be like springing a trap upon him."
2 the Supreme
Waiver of Objection. In Gary v. JordanU
Court reiterates what seems to be an unsound rule made in
earlier cases.' 3 Defendant was on the stand as a witness and
in cross-examination was asked questions concerning another
proceeding instituted against him by the State Veterinarian.
Counsel for defendant objected, presumably on grounds of
relevancy. This objection was overruled and the questioning
proceeded. On re-direct, defendant was questioned and testified on the same subject without reservation. The Supreme
Court held that this constituted a waiver of the objection.
This is distinctly a minority view. As the Supreme Court
of Texas has said :14
It would indeed be a strange doctrine, and a rule utterly
destructive of the right, and all the benefits of crossexamination, to hold a litigant to have waived his objection to improper testimony because by further inquiry
he sought on cross-examination to break the force or
demonstrate the untruthfulness of the evidence given in
chief, in the event, as would most usually occur, that
the witness should on cross-examination repeat or restate
some or all of his evidence given on his direct examination.
Professor McCormick agrees 5 with this latter view and
argues that the party should be entitled to treat the ruling
as the "law of the case" and explain or rebut the evidence
while preserving his exception.
10. The Court points out, 235 S. C. at 334, 111 S. E. 2d at 549, "A litigant is not required to produce as a witness every person who may give
evidence in his favor; and his failure to do so does not necessarily imply
a design on his part to suppress the truth."
11. 235 S. C. at 335, 111 S. E. 2d at 549.
12. 236 S. C. 144, 113 S. E. 2d 730 (1960).
13. McLane v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., 192 S. C. 245, 6 S. E. 2d 13 (1939);
Richardson v. Register, 227 S. C. 81, 87 S. E. 2d 40 (1955) ; Hutto v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 215 S. C. 90, 54 S. E. 2d 523 (1949).
14. Cathey v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 104 Tex. 39, -, 133 S. W. 417,
419 (1911).
15. MCCORMICX, EVmFNCE § 55, at 129 (1954).
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Sequestration of Witness. The Supreme Court in State v.
Britt0 again ruled 7 that sequestration of witnesses was a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that
no abuse of discretion was present. The defendant had
moved that the trial Judge sequester all witnesses. At the
request of the solicitor, the judge ruled that the sheriff, a
deputy sheriff, an officer of the State Highway Patrol and
Chief Strom, of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division could remain in court to assist the solicitor.18
Direct Evidence and Circumstantial Evidence
Jackson v. Jackson 9 was an action2 0 by plaintiff against
her husband to recover damages for alleged reckless operation
of an automobile driven by him, in which she was riding as
a guest. The answer admitted the accident, denied generally
the other material allegations of the complaint, and further
alleged that if defendant was guilty of recklessness, the
wife knew of and acquiesced in it and failed to take action
for her own protection, and that such acquiescence contributed as a proximate cause to the injuries she suffered. The
accident occurred about three a.m. on the morning of July 18,
1958. About midnight, the wife in her husband's car had
picked him up when he got off from work. They went to a
drive-in restaurant, where they stayed some time. The
wife testified that her husband took a drink of whiskey in
her presence from a bottle under the seat of the car and
put the bottle in his pocket. They then went to another drivein, which they left at about three o'clock. The wife testified
that that was all the drinking she saw her husband do and
that she did not think that he was intoxicated. She also
testified as to the speed of the car and its conduct just pre.
ceding the accident, which testimony was materially at
variance with eye-witness testimony of a police officer who
was in close pursuit of the car at that time. The officer
testified that when the husband got out of the car he was
staggering, that he was then "flat drunk" and anyone could
16. 235 S. C. 395, 111 S. E. 2d 669 (1959).

17. Citing State v. O'Neal, 210 S. C. 305, 42 S. E. 2d 523 (1947); State
v. Johnson, 156 S. C. 63, 152 S. E. 2d 825 (1930); 23 C. J. S. CriminalLaw

§§ 1010, 1011 (1955).

18. For an interesting general discussion see 6 WIGMoHRE, EVIDENCE
1837-1842 (1940).
19. 234 S. C. 291, 108 S. E. 2d 86 (1959).
20. Under the Guest Statute, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA

801 (1952).
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tell it, and that he (the officer) found an empty and a half
full whiskey bottle, apparently quarts, in the car. He said
that a strong odor of whiskey was present in the car. An
officer who arrived 15 minutes later also testified that it
was perfectly obvious that the defendant was drunk.
The trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff on
the issue of contributory wilfulness and liability and
submitted only the issue of damages to the jury, on
the theory that the defense had introduced no evidence to
contradict the allegations of the complaint. Apparently the
theory of the trial judge was that the plaintiff had testified
that she had not known that the defendant had been drinking
to excess, and since the defense had offered no evidence
on this, this testimony must be taken as true. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Moss, quite properly reversed,
holding that the circumstantial evidence raised a question for
the jury as to whether plaintiff knew or should have known
of the intoxicated condition of her husband, and continued
to ride as a guest in the car despite such knowledge.
The opinion of the trial court seems to be based on the
fallacy that direct evidence is intrinsically superior to circumstantial evidence, and can be met only by other direct
evidence. As Justice Moss succinctly points out, this overlooks the problem of credibility :21
The fact that the respondent's testimony was not contradicted by direct evidence did not have the effect of
making it undisputed or placing the stamp of verity upon
it. It was for the jury to pass upon the credibility of
the testimony of the respondent. In passing upon the
credibility of her testimony the jury could take into
consideration her interest in the result, the accuracy of
her recollection and all of the circumstances and surroundings tending to impeach her as witness or to throw
discredit on her statement.
The Court further pointed out that the circumstantial evidence provided a basis for an inference that plaintiff knew
of the condition of intoxication. Thus, a case in which one
party introduces direct evidence on an issue, favorable to his
no evidence at all
position, and the other party introduces
22
on that issue can be distinguished.
21. 234 S. C. at 298, 108 S. E. 2d at 89.
22. Competing views are found in the majority and dissenting opinions
in Borough of Nanty-Glo v. American Sur. C6., 309 Pa. 236, 163 AtI. 523
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Relevancy
Evidence of Other Crimes-the Molineux Rule. In State
v. Brooks,2 3 defendant was indicted for the rape of the
prosecutrix. The State was permitted to introduce evidence
to show that the prosecutrix and her sister-in-law were
walking along a street after dark to catch a bus and that
defendant at pistol point forced them into an alley and
raped both of them. Apprehended immediately after the acts,
defendant was taken to a police station, identified by the
victims and made and signed a written statement to the officers admitting intercourse with both women at the time
and place. No reference was made therein to use of
force or to the pistol. Defendant argued at the trial that
since his defense was consent and he did not deny commission of the acts, the testimony as to intercourse with the
prosecutrix' cempanion was inadmissible. 24 The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by the late Chief Justice, held that the
evidence as to the related crime was admissible as tending to
2
prove forcible rape and to negative consent.
State v. Bullock, 2 further discussed below, also involved
an application of this rule. Defendant in that case attacked
With a pistol the two occupants of an automobile in a
cemetery, a man and a woman, firing several shots. He was
indicted for the murder of the woman. Admitted into evidence was a bullet taken from the shoulder of the man.
The Court approved the admission of this testimony under
the Lyle27 case as tending to establish the identity of the perpetrator of the murder and to corroborate his confession.
CharacterNot in Issue. The orthodox rule in a criminal
case is that character of the defendant is not in issue unless
the defendant elects to put it in issue by introducing evidence
of his good character. This is a rule of relevancy in the
broad sense of the term, based on the policy that a defendant
(1932). A leading case is Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, 54 S. D. 446, 223
N. W. 585, 72 A.L.R. 7 (1929).
23. 235 S. C. 344, 111 S. E. 2d 686 (1959).
24. No objection was raised to this evidence at the trial, but the Supreme
Court considered the question in favorem vita, since the ease involved
capital punishment.
25. Citing the rule of State v. Lyle, 125 S. C. 406, 118 S. E. 803 (1923),

which case adopted the rule of the leading case on the point, People v.
Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901). A broader statement of the
rule than that in the Lyle case is offered by McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE § 157,

at 327 (1954).

26. 235 S. C. 356, 111 S. E. 2d 657 (1959).

27. State v. Lyle, supra note 25.
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is entitled to be tried on the case at bar, and possible prejudice would arise if his past history of crime were paraded
before the jury.23 A quite distinct rule with an indepedent
foundation in reason is the rule permitting impeachment of
the defendant if he takes the stand as a witness. In State v.
BTitt,29 which together with State v. Bullock3 ° provides an
excellent survey of much of the law of criminal evidence, Mr.
Justice Moss deals with the distinction.
Britt was charged with murder, along with one Tilson
and one Westbury, and the three were tried together. Tilson
was found guilty with recommendation of mercy, while Britt
and Westbury, also found guilty, were sentenced to death.
The latter two appealed. The defendants had moved for separate trials, asserting that their defenses were antagonistic.
All three has signed written confessions and made oral ones,
but Britt and Tilson had asserted that Westbury fired the
fatal shots, while Westbury contended that he had not. The
Supreme Court held that the ruling denying a separate trial
for each defendant was in the sound discretion of the trial
court. Since separate trials were refused below, inevitably
the problem termed by Wigmore "multiple admissibility"
arose at the trial.31 The confessions of each defendant
were admitted, with a limiting instruction from the trial
court that such confession applied only to the individual defendant making it, and statements therein relating to the
participation of other defendants were to be disregarded.
The confession aspect of the case is discussed below, but
the admission of the confessions led to the problem with
which we are here concerned. Appellant Westbury argued
on appeal that error was committed in the ruling of the
trial court limiting the cross examination of one Tuttle,
a witness for the State. This ruling excluded evidence of
previous convictions of Britt and Tilson for armed robbery
and grand larceny. Tuttle was a city detective on the Savannah police force. The theory of counsel for Westbury was
that this line of cross examination of Tuttle was permissible
since the confessions of Britt and Tilson were in evidence
and contained accusations against Westbury. The cross28. McCormick, supra note 25. Compare § 154, at 323 with § 42, at 89.
29. 235 S. C. 395, 111 S. E. 2d 669 (1959).
30. 235 S. C. 356, 111 S. E. 2d 657 (1959).
31. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 59 (1954); 1 WIGMOas,

EVIENCE. § 13

(3d ed. 1940).
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examination was resisted by counsel for Britt on the ground
that it would put the character of Tilson and Britt in issue.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the ruling of the trial
judge, held, first, that the confessions were properly admitted, second, that the limiting instruction telling the jury
that they could use each confession only against the respective defendant who made it adequately protected the other
defendants, and third, that since neither defendant had yet
taken the stand as a witness nor put character in issue by
producing testimony as to good character, evidence of convictions would have been improper. Westbury's theory was
that since the confessions were in evidence, Britt and Tilson
were in the same position as if they were already witnesses
and, therefore, could be impeached. Mr. Justice Moss appears quite correct in rejecting this theory; to hold otherwise
would deprive the defendants of their election whether or
not to take the stand. The admission of their confessions
were in no way equivalent to their being witnesses; the confessions are admitted as hearsay, under the admissions-confessions exception to the hearsay rule.
Tuttle was also asked by counsel for Westbury if these
defendants "were known to the [Savannah police] Department?" Considerable discussion ensued between the court,
the witness and counsel, in which discussion the Supreme
Court felt the jury inevitably was made aware that defendant Britt had a criminal record. The trial court eventually
ruled that the testimony was inadmissible and instructed
the jury to disregard it. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
held in fcvorem vitae that appellant Britt was prejudiced
by this fact being made known to the jury and a new trial
was granted.
Expert Testimony as Foundation to Show Relevancy. In
Gary v. Jordan,8 2 plaintiff brought an action for fraud and
deceit, alleging that six of twenty cows purchased by him from
defendant under assurances that they were "clean" were
positive reactors to brucellosis (Bang's disease), and that
this necessitated the slaughter of some thirty of plaintiff's
own cows. Plaintiff claimed that defendant knew of the existence or the possibility of Bang's disease in the cows subject to
the contract of sale. The twenty cows were delivered on July
14, 1956. On August 31, 1956, they were tested and six found
32. 236 S. C. 144, 113 S. E. 2d 730 (1960).
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to have the disease. These were removed and destroyed and
the remainder of the herd quarantined. On September 28,
the whole of plaintiff's herd, including the remaining purchased cows and some replacements sent by defendant for
the diseased cows was tested. No diseased cows and no suspects were then found. A test on November 14 revealed four
reactors and five suspects. Many later tests were made,
until a test on December 4, 1957 revealed no reactors and no
suspects. Defendant objected to the admission into evidence
of any test taken after the test of September 28, 1956, which
apparently showed a clean herd. His objection was that such
evidence was not related to or connected with his acts and
any disease appearing after that date was a result of plaintiff's mingling the purchased cattle with his own herd. Expert testimony for plaintiff had showed that Bang's disease
was highly infectious and could appear in an animal anywhere from fourteen days to seven or eight months after
exposure. In view of this testimony, the Supreme Court
held that the admission of the evidence of later tests and
of the resulting appearance therein of Bang's disease was
proper.
Lie-Detector Test. The Britt32 1 reversal was also based
upon the prejudicial effect of permitting the jury to hear
that defendant Britt was offered and refused to take a lie
detector test. Defendant Westbury asked to be given the
test and took it; defendants Britt and Tilson, on advice of
counsel, refused offered tests. Chief Strom of the State Law
Enforcement Division was questioned concerning the test
and was permitted to testify, over objection, that Britt refused to take such a test. After discussion with counsel
and an indication that the evidence might be admissible, the
trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony,
saying, "Of course, they are nothing but laymen, anyway.
They should have acted upon the advice of their counsel and
actually it was not their decision after all. ''32b A witness
Faulk had testified that less than one per cent of suspects
refuse to take the test, even though many are known criminals. 32 The Supreme Court held that, while the instruction
would in a normal case cure any error, in a case involving a
sentence to death extreme caution should be exercised lest
32a. State v. Britt, 235 S. C. 395, 111 S. E. 2d 669 (1959).

32b. Id. at 423, Id. at 684.
32c. Ibid.
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prejudicial testimony convict a defendant. Since the testimony could have affected the verdict, the Court granted a
new trial. In view of the indicated fact that defendant
acted on advice of counsel, the ruling seems correct. The
refusal to take the test under such circumstances would
have little weight as indicating a consciousness of guilt.
Hearsay
Ancient Documents-Exception to the Hearsay Rule. Town
of Ninety-Six v. Southern Ry. Co. 33 was a dispute as to the
width of the railway's right of way through the town. The
railway claimed it was one hundred feet on each side of the
center-line of its main track, while the town claimed it was
limited by written agreement to thirty feet from the centerline. The special act 34 of the legislature chartering the railroad's predecessor provided that in the absence of any written
contract, the land on which the track was constructed, together
with one hundred feet on each side, shall be presumed to have
been granted to the railroad. A search of plaintiff railroad's
records revealed no agreements limiting the right of way.
Some license agreements between the railroad and the town
between 1917 and 1931, incorporating by reference plats specifically showing the right-of-way north of the track to be
one hundred feet, were introduced. Defendant town offered
in evidence a copy of a letter dated September 3, 1872 and recorded in the office of the clerk of court for the county on
May 29, 1905. The original of this letter was not available
and the copy did not purport to be in the handwriting of the
author of the original. The letter contained the statements,
"In answer to your inquiry of last week about the public laids
at 96 I have to say that the R.R. claims 60 feet 30 on each
side that the balance of the land on each side of the R.R.
up to the line of the houses is public property." The purported author was a predecessor in title to the land before
the railroad was built. The identity of the addressee is not
indicated.
Two problems arise as to the admissibility of this offer,
as District Judge Stanley, writing for the Fourth Circuit,
points out in the instant case. First, the technical requirement of authentication must be satisfied. Here the court
33. 267 F. 2d 579 (4th Cir. 1959).
34. S. C. Act No. 2953, 11 Stat. (1845).
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recognizes the ancient documents rule as a substitute for the
usual procedure of authentication 35 The opinion suggests
that the letter could be properly excluded as not meeting the
requirements of this rule, since "there is doubt as to whether
the letter was produced from proper custody and is free from
suspicion since it was not found in a place where normally
would be found a genuine document such as a letter, and
was not recorded for almost thirty-three years after it was
allegedly written. . ..36 It seems regrettable that the court
did not stop here and rest on this sound ground. However,
the court proceeded on the hearsay question. Conceding without deciding that the authentication test was met, the court
held that the letter could properly be excluded as hearsay.
While recognizing that an ancient documents exception to
the hearsay rule exists, it found such an exception to be
limited to statements in wills, deeds and other documents
purporting to transfer land or personal property.3 7 This
38
is the position taken by the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
but Professor McCormick argues persuasively for a more
liberal rule.39
Admissions. Allen v. Island Co-op., Ltd.40 also involved an
offer of evidence which was held properly excluded under the
hearsay rule. The facts of the case are involved and restatement here is not warranted. Suffice to say that the question
was whether the Bank of Nova Scotia received a certain draft
as purchaser with full rights, or as a collection agent for Island Co-Operative. Allen had attached the proceeds as the
property of Island. Allen offered, as evidence tending to show
that the Bank held the draft for collection only, that one Cantrell had instituted a similar action in North Carolina against
Island and had attached two drafts therein, and that the Bank
there too had interposed a claim of ownership. During the
pendency of that action, one Jerome O'Brien, an officer of Island, had come to North Carolina and settled Cantrell's claim
by paying the agreed sum. During the negotiations, O'Brien
stated that Island had a credit arrangement with the Bank,
and that O'Brien would not have taken the trouble to come
".

35. Citing 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §§ 2137-2140 (3d ed. 1940); 20 Am.

JuR., Evidence § 932 (1939); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 744 (1955).

36. 267 F. 2d at 583.
37. Citing King v. Watkins, 98 Fed. 913, 917 (C.C.A. Va. 1899) and text
authorities.
38. Rule 63(29).
39. McCoRMIcx, EVIDENCE § 298 (1954).
40. 234 S. C. 537, 109 S. E. 2d 446 (1959).
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to North Carolina if Island "had not been interested in the
proceeds of the drafts which had been attached."' The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Moss held these remarks
were properly excluded. Both irrelevance and incompetence
of the evidence are given by Justice Moss as reasons for supporting exclusion. The irrelevancy argument rests on the fact
that the North Carolina transaction was an entirely different
contract; the incompetency argument is that the remark of
O'Brien is hearsay, and since there was no evidence that any
of the participants in that transaction were agents of the
Bank, the admissions exception to the hearsay rule does not
apply. The decision would appear sound on both grounds.
Confessions
In State v.
defendant, an illiterate Negro fortysix years of age, was indicted for the murder of a young white
woman in the early morning hours of August 3, 1958. At the
trial the confessions of the defendant, in considerable detail
and strongly corroborated by the evidence found at the scene
of the crime and by the defendant's leading the sheriffs to the
relevant sites, including the place where the body had been
hidden, were introduced in evidence. Under South Carolina
law, the admissibility of a confession is first determined by the
court out of hearing of the jury. Then, if the court finds it
admissible, the evidence as to its voluntariness is repeated to
the jury, and they are instructed to disregard it unless they
find it to have been voluntary. 43 This rule, criticized by Dean
McCormick, 44 is followed in many of our State courts. In the
instant case, the evidence of the sheriff who took the confessions was unequivocally to the effect that the confessions were
completely voluntary. Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined this witness, but did not shake his story 45 except to reveal
that the confessions as taken down and read back to the
defendant might not have been word for word what the defendant had said, but embodied the substance thereof. 46 The
confessions were then read to the jury.4r Later, in the presentation of the defendant's case, the defendant took the stand
Bullock,42

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
96-98.
46.
47.

234 S. C. at 549, 109 S.E. 2d at 450.
235 S. C. 356, 111 S. E. 2d 657 (1959).
WHALEY, SOUTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE, 9 S. C. L. Q., No. 4A, 34-36.
McCoRnircx, EVIDENCE § 112 (1954).
Transcript of Record, South Carolina v. Bullock, 90-98, especially
Id. at 101-102, 104-106.
State's Exhibits 9 & 10, I& at 104-106.
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and gave testimony to the effect that he had signed the confessions after two cotton sheets had been placed over his head
and he had been beaten and kicked by the officers. 4 8 The jury
was instructed to disregard the confession unless they found
it to have been made "freely and voluntarily and without fear
or duress of any kind and without reward or the slightest hope
of reward. ' 49 The defendant was found guilty of murder.
On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of the confessions, both under the State rule as above stated by the trial
judge in his instructions and under the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that on the uncontradicted testimony, it was shown5" (a) that defendant was a
Negro, (b) illiterate, (c) held incommunicado for four days
after his arrest, save for a conversation with his wife, who
was also a prisoner, at the jail, (d) continuously questioned
by several persons in authority, and (e) moved from one
jail to an older vacant jail, thence to the judge's chambers
adjoining a courtroom, to a motel, and finally to a jail in an
adjoining county, "all in the presence of a large number of
51
persons in authority and under the threat of mob violence."
Each of these factors, he argued, have been found relevant by
the Supreme Court of the United States on the issue of coercion of a confession. 52 The Supreme Court of South Carolina,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Moss, found no evidence in the
record to indicate, nor any attempt at the trial on the part of
53
the defendant to show, that he had been held incommunicado.
The Court found that the record indicated minimum, rather
than continual questioning. 54 As to the removals from place to
place, and the presence outside some of the prisons of a crowd
of two hundred to three hundred persons, the Court found
that they did not influence the confessions. At the time of
the confessions defendant had been moved to the adjoining
county where there was no crowd. Nothing in the record aside
from the testimony of the defendant himself indicated physical or psychological duress, and the Court held that this issue was properly submitted to the jury.55
48. Id. at 193-200.

49. Id. at 242-243.

50. Appellant's Brief at 11-12.
51. Id. at 12.

52. Id. at 11.
53. 235 S. C. at 371, 111 S. E. 2d at 664.

54. 235 S. C. at 372, 111 S. E. 2d at 665.

55. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States,

but the writ was dismissed per curiam on February 20, 1961, 29 U. S. L. W.
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In State v. Britt,5 6 defendant appellant Britt excepted to the
trial court's failure to excuse the jury while cross-examination
concerning the voluntary nature of the confessions of the
three defendants were pursued. The Supreme Court pointed
out that when the confessions of Britt and Tilson were offered
in evidence, counsel for these defendants expressly stated that
they had no objections thereto. Furthermore, the Court held
that since the confessions were held admissible by the trial
court, any error in the failure to hold the preliminary hearing
without the presence of the jury was cured.
Best Evidence Rule"Book of OriginalEntry"
Business Entries. In Graves v. Garvin.57 the principal dispute was as to the number of pounds of turkey held in storage
by the plaintiff for the account of the defendant Graves, a
farmer. As turkeys were prepared by Graves, he would turn
them over to Garvin's company and an employee thereof would
issue a receipt showing the quantity of each delivery. These
receipt forms were issued in triplicate, Graves receiving the
original and one carbon, and the other carbon being retained.
As turkeys were released to Graves for sale by him to a customer, he would receipt for them. These receipts of "ins" and
"outs" were posted in a bound "day book" for each customer.
The storage company plaintiff offered three of these day
books in evidence, together with an audit made by an accountant after examining all available receipts. The evidence
showed that the regular bookkeeper, Mrs. Sieg, generally prepared the receipts for "ins" and "outs" but that in her absence
other employees made them up. It was held that this procedure indicated that the company policy was to treat the
original receipts as temporary memoranda, and that the day
books therefore qualified as the books of original entry to
satisfy the best evidence rule.
ParolEvidence Rule
In Swift & Co. v. Griggs5 8 the plaintiff company sued H. H.
Griggs and Azalea R. Griggs for a balance due on certain
4197, the Court saying, "After hearing oral argument and fully examining
the record which was only partially set forth in the petition for certiorari,
we conclude that the totality of circumstances as the record makes them
manifest did not warrant bringing the case here. Accordingly, the writ is
dismissed."
56. 235 S. C. 395, 111 S. E. 2d 669 (1959).
57. 272 F. 2d 924 (4th Cir. 1959).
58. 235 S. C. 60, 109 S. E. 2d 710 (1959).
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accounts under written agreements dated November 27, 1956
and June 6, 1957. Plaintiff joined as a defendant J. C. Griggs,
who on November 30, 1956 had agreed in writing to guarantee
performance of the first above agreement and payment of all
accounts thereunder. By a second defense, defendants alleged
facts which they argued led to showing that the alleged contract was a nullity. They stated that on November 1, 1956,
one Sansbury and one Lee, the latter an agent of the plaintiff,
called upon the defendants and said that plaintiff was desirous
of putting Sansbury, whose wife was a sister of one defendant
and a daughter of another, in business. Sansbury was then
in poor financial condition, having just lost his business, and
had numerous liens and judgments against him, and so could
not have property shipped to him personally. The Griggses
were urged by Lee and Sansbury to sign the contracts themselves, and plaintiff would put Sansbury in business, would
supervise his operations and approve his choice of customers.
In response to this offer, defendants signed the contracts and
the notes, and the defendant J. C. Griggs signed the guarantee. Defendants further alleged that these promises were
reiterated by Lee, within the scope of his employment, from
time to time through July of 1957.19 In upholding the striking
of this defense by the trial court, the Supreme Court through
Mr. Justice Taylor said: 60
Defendants' second defense and the stricken words of the
third defense attempt to set up the defense of failure of
consideration based upon the alleged breach of a contemporaneous parol agreement inconsistent with the terms
of the written instrument to the extent of rendering it
practically meaningless. This they will not be permitted
to do in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake ....
Appellants in their answer do not allege fraud, accident
or mistake but seek to show an entirely inconsistent and
contradictory parol agreement.
An application of the same rule to different circumstances
was involved in Smith v. DuRant.61 Defendant had purchased
from plaintiff, represented at the time by a guardian ad litem,
certain lots in Lake City, being lots 57A, 58A and 59A as
59. Plaintiffs' suit also involved a note dated July 26, 1957, as to which

note defendants alleged in a third defense lack of any consideration other

than plaintiffs' promises referred to in the second defense. This complica-

tion is omitted from discussion herein.
60. 235 S. C. at 65, 109 S. E. 2d at 712.

61. 236 S. C. 80, 113 S. E. 2d 349 (1960).
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shown on a certain plat, which indicated that 57A adjoined
Jot 56A, the latter owned by one Burroughs. In reality, there
eexisted between lot 56A and 57A another lot of over two
;hundred foot frontage omitted from the plat due to a sur-veyor's error. Plaintiff sued for possession of this lot arguing
. that it was not included within the deed conveying the three
-lots to defendant. Citing the parol evidence rule, defendant
,objected to the admission of testimony of another surveyor,
vone Floyd, who had in 1947 surveyed the whole town and distcovered the error in the earlier plat. In November, 1955,
plaintiff had learned of the error and in March, 1956, brought
suit. In supporting a directed verdict for the plaintiff below, 62 the Supreme Court held that the testimony of the sur-

veyor, Floyd, was admissible. Chief Justice Stukes pointed
out for the Court: 3
Appellant's position is inconsistent. He claims that he
bought by the Isenhower plat whereby his purchase included the disputed area and extended toward the north
to lot 56A; but the plat did not include or show the disputed area. How, then, could he have acquired the disputed area if he bought by the plat?
'The Court held the testimony admissible under the rule per.itting parol in cases of fraud, accident, or mistake.64 Clearly
there was a mistake in the original plat.
In Graves v. Ga'rvin, 5 it was argued that inventory receipts
given to defendant to inform him as to how many turkeys he
had in storage with plaintiff were warehouse receipts within
the Georgia Warehouse Act, 6 and hence contracts to which
the parol evidence rule applied. The warehouse statement in
question indicated that thirty-eight thousand pounds of turkey were in storage. However, plaintiff's parol and other
evidence indicated that the amount was far less, and that the
warehouse statement was in error because plaintiff's agent
had accepted defendant's representation as to the quantity in
storage. Defendant had subsequently acknowledged this error,
plaintiff maintained. Plaintiff argued that parol evidence to
show the error in the warehouse statement was inadmissible.
The Fourth Circuit indicated that it "would concede" that if
62. The record also contained evidence that defendant did not originally
believe that the omitted lot was included in his deed.
63. 236 S. C. at 90, 113 S. E. 2d at 356.
64. See statement of Mr. Justice Taylor, supra note 60.
65. Supra note 57.

66. GA. ANN. CODS tit. 111 §§ 501-530 (Supp. 1955).
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the inventory statements were warehouse receipts within the
Georgia Act, they would be construed as contracts and parol
would be inadmissible to vary their terms. 67 However, the
Court sustained the judgment below, holding the documents
were not warehouse receipts. It was pointed out that much
of the information required by the statute to be contained
in a warehouse receipt was lacking from the document in
question.
Demonstrative Evidence
Use of Blackboardin Aid of Argument to Jury. In Johnson
v. Charleston & W. C. Ry.,68 an action for wrongful death,
counsel for defendant raised as a basis for a new trial the
fact that the plaintiff's counsel had used the blackboard in the
course of his argument to the jury, making calculations thereon using some figures not drawn from the testimony. It was
also objected that counsel used the figure 17 (decedent's life
expectancy) to multiply by decedent's annual income, to reach
a figure for total damages for loss of earning power. Decedent
was earning $4,000 per year and drawing a veteran's pension
of $600 per year. The product of life expectancy and present
earnings would be $78,200. The jury's verdict was for $67,618
actual damages. Of course, such calculation on the blackboard
would be erroneous and prejudicial, since prospective loss of
earnings must be reduced to their present cash value. However, the trial judge so instructed the jury in his charge, after
which he asked counsel if there was anything else they wished
him to charge, and they replied in the negative. Defendant also urged that counsel for plaintiff used some figures not drawn from the testimony in making his blackboard
calculations, but the transcript of record failed to indicate
enough detail for the Court to pass on this. These objections
at the trial took place during and immediately after the final
arguments of counsel for plaintiff. The trial court held that
counsel had used the blackboard purely as argument and not
as introducing evidence, and that such use was "more or less
court routine," but added, "any matters that you think I
should instruct the jury in it would help me if you would
write down what you think I should say. '0 9 On appeal, the
67. Although arguably the mistake exception to the parol evidence rule

as indicated in the two South Carolina Cases, Griggs and DuRant, would
then apply to permit the introduction of parol testimony.
68. 234 S.C. 448, 108 S. E. 2d 777 (1959).
69. 234 S. C. at 465, 108 S. E. 2d at 785.
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Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff. On
the issue of the use of the blackboard, Mr. Justice Legge
said :70
There is no impropriety in counsel's use of blackboard
during his argument to the jury, for the purpose of fairly
illustrating points that are properly arguable. (AuthoriCalculations made, or diagrams drawn,
ties cited) ...
thereon are of course not evidence. Like statements of
counsel in oral argument, they should have reasonable
foundation in the evidence or in inferences fairly arguable
from the evidence. Just as oral argument may be abused,
so may such visual argument; and its abuse may be so
flagrant as to require a new trial. Control of the arguments of counsel, with regard to the use of such visual
aids, as with regard to oral statements, rests in the
sound discretion of the trial judge. (Cases Cited).
Since the trial judge asked for and was not offered further
instructions to the jury, the Court held that any failure to
caution the jury that the blackboard calculations were not
evidence but argument furnished no basis for reversal.
Miscellaneous
Improper Argument. Also in the Johnson case,71 defendant
urged error in denial of a new trial based on improper argument to the jury. Defendant-appellant claimed that counsel
for plaintiff argued that a human life was worth as much in
Allendale County as it is in Hampton or Charleston County,
and that a jury in the former county should make an award
in wrongful death cases comparable to awards in the latter two
counties in similar cases. Since counsel denied making any
such statement, nothing in the record indicating such a statement having been made, and no objection thereto being made
until after verdict, the Supreme Court refused to consider this
exception.
Legislation. It appears that no legislation bearing on the
rules of evidence was enacted during the 1960 session of the
General Assembly.
70. Ibid.
71. Johnson v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 234 S. C. 448, 108 S. E. 2d 777
(1959).
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